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Does the Participation of a Non-Article Ill
Judge Render a Circuit Court Panel's
Judgment Invalid?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 333-337. © 2003 American Bar Association.
ISSUE
Was the Ninth Circuit's judgment
vitiated by the participation of a
non-Article III judge?
FACTS
After a drug-detector dog at the
Guam Main Postal Facility alerted to
an express mail parcel addressed to
"Linda Phan" at a post office box,
law enforcement officials obtained a
search warrant and took the parcel
to the Guam Customs Contraband
Enforcement Team office. A cus-
toms officer X-rayed the parcel and
found it contained five cylindrical
objects. An officer opened the par-
cel and discovered methampheta-
mine (meth) placed in five small
canisters. The officers replaced the
crystal meth with rock salt and
wired the package so that it would
send a radio signal when opened.
They restored the parcel to its origi-
nal wrapping and arranged with the
postal agents to make a controlled
delivery.
After a notice of Express Mail was
placed in the post office box, Tuyet
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Mai Thi Phan (Phan) retrieved the
notice, presented it to a postal
clerk, and received the package. She
signed for the package as "Lin Da
Phan." Phan left the post office and
got in a car driven by Tina, the
younger sister of Phan Phuong
Nguyen (Nguyen). They then took
the package to Nguyen's apartment.
After the agents were alerted by the
radio signal that the package had
been opened, they approached
Nguyen's apartment. They observed
Phan leave another apartment and
enter Nguyen's apartment. Without
a warrant, the agents then entered
Nguyen's apartment and found Phan
and Nguyen in the living room.
They saw parts of the opened parcel
and some of its contents inside the
front bedroom. They found three
cylindrical objects in the bathtub
and two in the toilet bowl. Nguyen
and Phan were then arrested.
(Continued on Page 334)
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FROM: THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Vhen the agents had previously
epacked the parcel, they installed a
clue spray" that would be revealed
nder black light if it later showed
p on somebody's hands. When
rrested, Nguyen's hands showed
vidence of the spray. Phan's hands
iere clean. Phan said she had been
i her kitchen cooking lunch when
he package was opened. Although
'ina was not indicted, her hands
iad a trace of the clue material on
,ne of her fingers.
'he package in which the meth had
,een shipped contained an address
i Garden Grove, California. A
'olice investigation there turned up
man named Thanh Phuong
Tguyen (Thanh), whose driver's
cense listed the same address as
he address on the package,
lthough he did not in fact live at
hat address. Thanh turned out to
,e Nguyen's brother and Phan's
ephew.
)n the first day of the trial of
rguyen and Phan, the defendants
bjected to any introduction of evi-
ence regarding Thanh's connection
the defendants. The district court
verruled the objection, stating that
ie evidence was relevant because
ie address on Thanh's driver's
cense was the same as that listed
n the return address of the parcel.
)n March 29, 2000, Nguyen and
han were convicted in the U.S.
listrict Court for the District of
'uam of conspiracy to import meth,
nowingly aiding and abetting
nportation of meth, and attempting
) possess over 50 grams of meth
'ith intent to distribute. Each was
ntenced to 212 months on each
Dunt, to be followed by five years
f supervised release.
in appeal, the defendants argued
iat the trial court had abused its
iscretion in admitting evidence of
ie consanguinity (family relation-
ship) between themselves and
Thanh and that there was
insufficient evidence to support
their convictions.
A three-judge panel of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, including a territorial judge
from the District Court for the
Northern Mariana Islands sitting by
designation, held that the evidence
of consanguinity connecting the
defendants' brother and nephew to
the defendants was not irrelevant
and unfairly prejudicial. 284 F.3d
1086 (9th Cir. 2002). The court also
held that the evidence was sufficient
to support their conviction. The
defendants did not object to the
participation of the chief district
judge in the decision.
The United States Supreme Court
thereafter granted Nguyen's and
Phan's petitions requesting review of
the Ninth Circuit's decision. 123
S.Ct. 512 (2002); 123 S.Ct. 513
(2002). The two cases were then
consolidated for hearing.
CASE ANALYSIS
Article III of the U.S. Constitution
provides that the judicial power of
the United States is vested "in one
Supreme Court and in such inferior
courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish."
Federal courts have long been char-
acterized as being either constitu-
tional courts of the United States or
legislative courts in the territories
created by an act of Congress. See
Callwood v. Callwood, 127 F.Supp.
179, 181 (D.V.I. 1954). The district
courts in the 50 states, the District
of Columbia, and Puerto Rico are
constitutional courts, that is, courts
established under Article III of the
U.S. Constitution. See the districts
listed in 28 U.S.C. §§ 81-131. The
concept of a "legislative court"
derives from the opinion of Chief
Justice Marshall in American
Insurance Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511
(1828). Concluding that Article III
of the Constitution did not apply to
the territories, Chief Justice
Marshall wrote:
Courts in the territories of the
United States are not constitu-
tional Courts in which the judi-
cial power conferred by the
Constitution on the general gov-
ernment, can be deposited. They
are incapable of receiving it.
They are legislative Courts, cre-
ated in virtue of the general right
of sovereignty which exists in the
government, or in virtue of that
clause which enables Congress to
make all needful rules and regu-
lations, respect to the territory
belonging to the United States.
1 Pet. at 546. See also Glidden Co.
v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 544-45
(1962).
The U.S. district courts are listed in
28 U.S.C. §§ 81-131. The district
courts for Guam, the Northern
Mariana Islands, and the Virgin
Islands are not included in this list.
The district courts listed in 28
U.S.C. H 81-131 are created under
Article III of the Constitution.
Mookini v. United States, 303 U.S.
201, 205 (1938). In Mookini, the
Supreme Court said that the term
"'District Courts of the United
States,' as used in the [Criminal
Appeals Rules], without an addition
expressing a wider connotation, has
its historic significance. It describes
the constitutional courts created
under article 3 of the Constitution.
Courts of the Territories are legisla-
tive courts, properly speaking, and
are not District Courts of the United
States." The Court concluded that
"vesting a territorial court with
jurisdiction similar to that vested in
the District Courts of the United
States does not make it a 'District
Court of the United States."' See
also 28 U.S.C. § 451.
The district judges who sit as judges
in the U.S. district courts are
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appointed pursuant to Article III of
the U.S. Constitution. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 133. It enumerates the districts
contained within all 50 states, the
District of Columbia, and Puerto
Rico. Guam, the Virgin Islands, and
the Northern Mariana Islands are
not on this list. As Article III judges,
the judges in the districts listed in
§ 133 "hold their Offices during
good Behaviour, and shall, at stated
Times, receive for their Services,
a Compensation, which shall
not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office." U.S. Const.,
Art. III.
Article IV judges, on the other hand,
occupy judgeships created under
Congress's power under Article IV of
the Constitution "to dispose of and
make all needful rules and regula-
tions respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the
United States." Judges in the
District of Guam and the District of
the Northern Mariana Islands are
Article IV judges. Unlike judges
appointed under Article III of the
Constitution, Article IV judges are
not protected by tenure or salary
guarantees.
There have been few occasions for
the courts to interpret the term
"districts" as used in Section 451.
In Government of the Virgin
Islands v. Gereat. 502 F.2d 914 (3d
Cir. 1974), the Third Circuit consid-
ered whether the federal trial court
in the Virgin Islands was a "district"
for purposes of Title 28 of the U.S.
Code. The Third Circuit concluded
that the trial court in the Virgin
Islands was not a "district court" for
purposes of Title 28.
In Mookini v. United States, 303
U.S. 201 (1938), the Supreme Court
held that the then-territorial District
Court of Hawaii was not a "United
States District Court" for purposes
of the Criminal Appeals Rules. See
also Talbot v. McCarrey 218 F.2d
565, 566 (9th Cir. 1954) (then-terri-
torial Alaska District Court not a
"court of the United States"); Wells
v. United States, 214 F.2d 380 382
(5th Cir. 1954) (District Court for
the Canal Zone was not a "district
court").
Appeals from the District Court of
Guam (a legislative court) must be
taken to the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit (an Article III,
constitutional court). 28 U.S.C. §
1294(4). The Chief Judge of the
Ninth Circuit may assign "district
judges within the circuit to sit upon
the court of appeals whenever the
business of that court so requires."
28 U.S.C. § 292(a). Section 451 of
Title 28 of the U.S. Code defines
the term "district" as meaning "the
districts enumerated in Chapter 5
of [Title 28]." The districts
enumerated in Chapter 5 are
listed in §§ 81-131.
In response to the petitioners' argu-
ment that the assignment of the
chief judge of the District of the
Northern Mariana Islands to the
panel violated § 1294(4), the gov-
ernment says that the passage of §
1294(4) did not expand the peti-
tioners' constitutional rights.
Furthermore, the respondent argues
that nothing in Article III precludes
its judges from adjudicating territor-
ial cases in conjunction with an
Article IV judge.
The petitioners argue that the Ninth
Circuit's designation of an Article IV
judge was unauthorized by 28
U.S.C. § 292. They assert that the
plain meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 292(a)
precludes the designation of a judge
from the District Court for the
Northern Mariana Islands to sit on
the Ninth Circuit. The petitioners
suggest that, even if the question
presented could not be so easily
answered by simple reference to H6
292 and 451, the Court should con-
strue § 292 to forbid the type of des-
ignation made here in order to
avoid the constitutional difficulties
that would result from a contrary
interpretation.
Even if the designation were permit-
ted by 28 U.S.C. § 292, the petition-
ers argue that the designation vio-
lates the constitutional command
that Article III judicial power be
vested in judges with life tenure and
a guaranteed salary. They claim that
when a case is to be decided by an
Article III court, the Constitution
requires that it be decided by
Article III judges with the full
panoply of Article III protections.
The government agrees with the
petitioners' assertion that Title 28
does not expressly authorize, as a
matter of statutory law, the designa-
tion of territorial judges to sit on the
federal courts of appeals. However,
the respondent argues that the peti-
tioners abandoned their statutory
objection to the composition of the
Ninth Circuit panel. According to
the government, the petitioners for-
feited their statutory objection to
the composition of the panel by fail-
ing to raise it before the Court of
Appeals. The respondent points out
that the petitioners did not chal-
lenge the composition of the court
of appeals at any time before filing
their petitions for review by the
Supreme Court-petitioners filed no
objection to the composition of the
panel before oral argument, peti-
tioner Nguyen made no objection at
oral argument, and the petitioners
never requested a rehearing or a
rehearing en banc.
The government suggests that, at
least with respect to petitioner
Nguyen, the objections belatedly
raised before the Supreme Court
were knowingly waived in the lower
courts. Respondent says that coun-
sel for Nguyen approached the two
Ninth Circuit judges at a meeting of
(Continued on Page 336)
American Bar Association 335
the Guam Bar Association the day
before oral argument and mentioned
there might be a problem with the
chief judge of the District of the
Northern Mariana Islands sitting on
the panel because he was not an
Article III judge.
The petitioners assert that
Congress's plenary power over the
territories does not diminish the
force of the Article III principles.
Recognizing that it is quite possible
that, given Congress's power over
territorial courts, Congress constitu-
tionally could have provided a dif-
ferent, more limited, right of appeal
and might even have created an
amalgamated court such as the pan-
el that heard the petitioners' cases,
the petitioners argue that Congress
did not create such a court and
instead specifically provided (in 28
U.S.C. § 1294(4)) that appeals from
the District Court of Guam will be
heard by the Ninth Circuit, an
Article III court.
The government replies that the
protections of Article III are inap-
plicable to cases arising within the
territories. The respondent quotes
from Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370
U.S. 530 (1962), in which the
Supreme Court stated that
in the territories cases and contro-
versies falling within the enumera-
tion of Article III may be heard and
decided in courts constituted with-
out regard to the limitations of that
article; courts, that is, having judges
of limited tenure and entertaining
business beyond the range of con-
ventional cases and controversies.
370 U.S. at 544-45 (plurality
opinion) (footnote omitted). The
respondent asserts that residents
of the territories have no indepen-
dent right to adjudication in a con-
stitutionally proper forum under
Article III.
The Appointments Clause of Article
II of the Constitution provides that
the president, with the advice and
consent of the Senate, has the pow-
er to appoint "principal officers" of
the United States. Judges of the fed-
eral circuit courts are "principal
officers" and must therefore be
appointed by the president and con-
firmed by the Senate. The petition-
ers argue that the designation of an
Article IV judge to sit on an Article
III court violates the Appointments
Clause.
According to the petitioners,
because judges on the federal courts
of appeals are "principal officers"
for purposes of the Appointments
Clause, they may only be appointed
by the president. The petitioners
claim that allowing a member of the
judiciary to place judges on Article
III courts would subvert the very
purpose of the Appointments
Clause.
The government responds that the
Supreme Court has never held that
the Appointments Clause applies to
the governance of the United States
territories. It is the respondent's
position that the petitioners are not
within the class of persons protect-
ed by the Appointments Clause and
that a transgression of that clause, if
any, cannot invalidate the judg-
ments affirming their convictions in
a territorial court. In addition, the
government argues that the limited
designation of a territorial judge to
sit within a territory and hear
appeals in cases from territorial
courts does not violate the
Appointments Clause.
The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure provide that "plain
errors" or defects affecting "sub-
stantial rights" may be noticed even
if they were not brought to the
attention of the court by the parties.
Under the plain error rule, an appel-
late court may correct an error not
raised below whenever there is
(1) an error, (2) that is plain, and
(3) that affects substantial rights, so
long as the error seriously affects
the fairness, integrity, or public rep-
utation of judicial proceedings.
It is the petitioners' position that
the designation of the chief judge of
the District of the Northern Mariana
Islands violated the plain meaning
of 28 U.S.C. § 292 and was forbid-
den by both Article III and the
Appointments Clause. They say
the error was so manifest as to
be "plain." The petitioners contend
that the error both affected
their substantial rights and calls
into question the fairness, integrity,
or public reputation of the judicial
proceeding.
The government disagrees that the
designation of the chief judge of the
District of the Northern Mariana
Islands to the Ninth Circuit panel
was plain error. First, it says that no
plain error occurred because noth-
ing in Title 28 expressly precludes
the designation of territorial
district judges to sit on court of
appeals panels. The respondent
points out that no authority specifi-
cally addressed, let alone forbade
the designation.
Second, the respondent contends
that the petitioners' substantial
rights were not affected. The gov-
ernment notes that the appeal was
heard and decided by two Article III
judges, in addition to the chief judge
of the District of the Northern
Mariana Islands, and that both of
the Article III judges agreed that
petitioners' challenges to the district
court's evidentiary rulings were
without merit. The government
declares that the petitioners cannot
simply presume prejudice from the
fact that the chief judge of the
Northern Mariana Islands was
present on the panel and during
deliberations.
Issue No. 6
Third, the respondent states that
any error that occurred did not
affect the Ninth Circuit's jurisdic-
tion. It says there is no question
that, under the relevant statutory
provisions, the Ninth Circuit had
subject matter jurisdiction over the
appeal. The government observes
that Congress has already deter-
mined that the presence of two
Ninth Circuit judges on a panel is
sufficient to empower that court to
exercise jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C.
46(d) (two judges constitute a quo-
rum for a court of appeals panel).
Fourth, the respondent argues that
any error did not seriously affect
the fairness, integrity, or public rep-
utation of the judicial proceedings.
It points out that there are no alle-
gations of actual unfairness, partiali-
ty, or lack of judicial acumen direct-
ed at the chief judge of the District
for the Northern Mariana Islands.
SIGNIFICANCE
The petitioners say that this case
has "profound implications" for our
constitutional system of governance
and presents grave and sensitive
questions about the intersecting
powers of the judicial, legislative,
and executive branches of govern-
ment under Articles II, III, and IV of
the Constitution. The government,
on the other hand, states that this
case at most involves an isolated,
one-time mistake in statutory con-
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